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NOTES AND COMMENTS
REIMBURSING AIRLINE STRIKE LOSSES WITH FEDERAL
SUBSIDY: THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT ALOFT*
ADMINISTRATION of the airline subsidy program, difficult in itself, becomes
more complex when the program interacts with national labor relations policy.
Section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act 1 provides for subsidization by
authorizing financial aid needed by mail carriers to "maintain and continue
the development of air transportation . . . required for the commerce of the
United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense." 2 Implementing
*American Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
1. 52 Stat. 998 (1938) (now Federal Aviation Act § 406, 72 Stat. 763 (1958)). In
this Note, the Civil Aeronautics Act is referred to as "the act.' On August 23, 1958, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Aviation Act. 72 Stat. 731 (1958). Section 1401(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act repealed the Civil Aeronautics Act. However, §§ 406(b) and 401
(1) (4) of the Civil Aeronautics Act (the only sections involved in this Note) were re-
enacted as §§ 406(b) and 401(k) (4) of the new legislation.
The act sought to provide a comprehensive scheme of air transportation regulation.
See North Am. Airlines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 432, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds sub nons. American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956)
("Congress was determined to formulate an over-all policy for the regulation of air trans-
portation") ; United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100, 105 (7th Cir. 1952) (the act
sought to remedy the chaotic condition of air transportation by providing a system of
regulated competition). See also DEARING & OwEN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY
44-57, 196-225 (1949) (treatment of airlines as one component of federally controlled trans-
portation) ; RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AcT ANNOTATED (1939) ; Ballard, Federal
Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1235 (1947) ; Comment, Public Regulation of
Domestic Airlines: A Proposal for Structural and Subsidy Reform, 60 YALE L.J. 1196
(1951).
2. 52 Stat. 998 (1938) (now Federal Aviation Act § 406(b), 72 Stat. 763 (1958)).
In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under this sec-
tion, the Board ... shall take into consideration .. . the need of each such air
carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the per-
formance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier,
to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of
the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal
Service, and the national defense.
Ibid.
Inclusion of subsidy payments in the carrier's compensation for carrying the mail was
strenuously objected to as a form of concealment. See, e.g., Marvin, Air Mail Subsidy
Separation, 40 GEo. L.J. 161 (1952) ("No one really knows how much of this mail pay is
subsidy . . ."). Attempts to meet this objection through the separate reporting of "need
pay" (subsidy) and "service pay" (reasonable value of services rendered) were delayed
by difficulties in allocating the airline's costs among mail, passenger, and freight service.
See GILL & BATES, AIRLINE COMPETITION 483 (1949); Bunke, The Fetish of Separating
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this statutory mandate, the Civil Aeronautics Board generally fixes each sub-
sidized carrier's mail rate at a level sufficiently high to cover operating ex-
penses and guarantee a return on the airline's investment.3 The Board utilizes
cost estimates to establish a temporary future rate which it revises retrospec-
tively to reflect the carrier's actual expenses.4 In making this final revision, the
CAB may subsidize only those expenditures which resulted from "honest,
economical, and efficient management" 5 and which were necessary to the de-
Subsidy From Air Mail Payments, 20 J. AIR L. & Com. 273, 275 (1953); Hearings on
S. 436 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 132-34 (1952). Compare id. at 202-04, 259-60 (describing ICC rate-setting, where
similar problem seemingly presented no obstacle). But public and congressional pressure
eventually forced adoption of a separate reporting procedure in 1951. See Nyrop, Tic
Question of U.S. Air Mail Subsidy, 18 J. AIR L. & Coms. 409, 415 (1951). Separation was
further facilitated by Reorganization Plan No. 10, 67 Stat. 644 (1953), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15
(Supp. V, 1958), which shifted subsidy disbursements to the CAB's budget, leaving only
mail-carrying payments in the Post Office Department's. Separation has been made a part
of the new Federal Aviation Act. § 406(c), 72 Stat. 764 (1958). Subsidies thus were made
readily susceptible to legislative scrutiny. See Rasenberger, Legislative and Administrative
Control of Air Carrier Subsidy, 25 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 397, 408 (1957).
The Board distributed $42,000,000 in subsidies during 1957. 1957 CAB ANN. RaP. 10.
One commentator has suggested that not all of these funds are used to effectuate the broad
national interests which the act seeks to promote. Hellman, Comment on Air Mail Sub-
sidy, 25 IND. L.J. 43, 44-45 (1949) ("the Board has dispensed the subsidy primarily to
support needy airlines and not to further a maximum transport system"). See generally
O'Connell, Air "Mail Pay" Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 25 IND. L.J. 27 (1949). For
other forms of government aid to transportation, see BEHLING, SUBSIDIES TO TrAiNSPORTA-
TION (Public Affairs Bull. No. 86, Library of Cong. Legislative Reference Serv. 1950).
3. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 31; 55 COLUm. L. REv. 933 & n.6 (1955) (collecting
cases).
4. See, e.g., Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc., 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22180 (CAB May 15, 1958);
Mohawk Airlines, Inc., IA Av. L. Ra:p. ff 22161 (CAB Jan. 24, 1958) ; Transatlantic Final
Mail Rate, 1954-1957 Av. L. REP. 21787 (CAB 1954). The use of a retrospectively
revised rate closely resembles a "cost-plus" method of rate-setting. See Gambrell & Smith,
The Separation of Subsidy From Air Mail Payments, 1 J. PuB. L. 71, 85 (1952). "Cost-
plus" rate-setting was originally rejected by both the CAB and the courts as tending to
encourage inefficiency. See Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. CAB, 336 U.S. 601, 606
(1949) (cost-plus system does not "harmonize with the apparent design of the act");
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 8 C.A.B. 685, 696-701 (1947) (rejecting "cost-plus
subsidy plans"). But the Board in effect reversed itself when the difficulty of accurately
predicting costs "forced" it to utilize retrospective rate setting. See Hearings on S. 436,
supra note 2, at 106-07. The courts subsequently approved this change in procedure. See
American Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But see
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 207 F.2d 200, 205 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 347 U.S. 67 (1953)
(opposing temporary rates and suggesting that rate-setting difficulties would be eliminated
if "what is prospective in legal theory will be prospective in actual fact"). See also Trans-
continental & W. Air, Inc. v. CAB, supra at 612 (dissenting opinion) (basis of subsidy
payments should be "experience rather than . . . prophecy") ; Hellman, szpra, note 2, at
45-46 (retrospective rates reduce incentive to efficiency).
5. See text of statute quoted note 2 supra. The Board has never specifically defined
"honest, economical and efficient." Cf. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 34-35 (former CAB
chairman attempts definition). Nevertheless, the statutory phrase has been used as authori-
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velopment of the airline. 6 Expectations of reimbursement by the Board neces-
sarily influence management decisions. 7  In the area of labor relations, this
influence can subvert the policies of the Railway Labor Act 8-which embraces
airlines and seeks to prevent labor strife by encouraging union equality in
zation to disallow a variety of costs. See National Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 387, 394 (1946)
(costs resulting from airline's failure to maintain "operating standards") ; National Air-
lines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 567, 575 (1944) (excessive executive salaries) ; Mid-Continent Air-
lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 464, 471-72 (1942) (certain stewardess salaries) ; 55 CoLum. L. REv.
933, 934 & nn.14 & 15 (1955) (collecting additional cases). Accord, Braniff Airways, Inc.,
4 C.A.B. 588, 597 (1944) (reviewing advertising expenses).
6. Section 406(b) indicates that expenditures may be disallowed when nondevelop-
mental. See text of statute quoted note 2 supra. Since "need" under § 406(b) refers to
funds needed for air transportation development, the Board has freely disallowed costs
which make good business sense but do not promote the air transportation system. "[Some]
expenses will include ...those not allowable for rate-making purposes such as enter-
tainment and contributions expense ... interest expense and other nonoperating expenses
which are unrelated or unnecessary to the air transport operation." Western Air Lines,
Inc., 14 C.A.B. 201,227-28 (1950). See also Continental Air Lines, Inc., 8 C.A.B. 825, 839
(1947) (sponsorship of basketball team) ; National Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 567, 569 (1944)
(certain legal fees); Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 4 C.A.B. 463, 469 (1943) (investment in
steamship company); Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 161, 181 (1941) (operation
of cafeteria "within managerial discretion" but not essential to air-carrier operation).
The statute does not indicate who bears the burden of proof in cases of expense dis-
allowance. In practice, the Board probably has the burden when expenses have already
been incurred, while the airline must justify proposed expenditures. See O'Connell, supra
note 2, at 33.
7. See cases cited notes 5, 6 supra; Hearings on S. 350 Before the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1949) (CAB chairman
discussing the Board's "potent power" of disallowance). As a result of Board refusal to
reimburse certain expenditures, airlines will probably curtail "good-will" gestures, such
as the sponsorship of a basketball team or the employment of stewardesses, and avoid
certain types of investment, particularly in areas other than air transportation. On the
other hand, an airline about to break even and go off subsidy might incur any expense
thought likely to increase profits.
Airline fear of nonreimbursement may be lessened by the realization that the Board has
never allowed a subsidized carrier to become bankrupt. See DEARING & OWEN, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 212 (subsidy policy "discards the inexorable and historic test of managerial
efficiency-the ability to survive in a competitive market") ; Hellman, supra note 2, at 49;
O'Connell, supra, note 2, at 37. But cf. KAHN, INDusrRIAL RELATIONS IN THE AMIaNES [:]
THE INTERACrioN OF UNIONS, MANAGEMENTS, AND GOVERNMENT IN A REGULATED AND
SUBSIDIZED INDUSTRY 48 (unpublished thesis in Harvard University Library 1950) [here-
inafter cited as KAHN] (public pressure acts to "increase industry's concern for costs").
Board control over managerial policies is not limited to the subsidy program and can
be exerted in other areas. See Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 45, 49-50 (1939)
(reviewing Board powers) ; Leonard, Collective Bargaining in the Regulated Industries
-Discussion, 42 Am. EcoN. REv. 702, 703 (Supp. 1952) (comparing the extensive powers
of the CAB with those of the ICC).
8. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952). The act was extended
to airlines in 1936. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1952). See generally
Frankel, Airline Labor Policy, the Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR L. &
Com. 461, 462-66 (1951).
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collective bargainingP9-because anticipated subsidization of such business costs
as strike losses may jeopardize the union's bargaining position.10 When con-
fronted with this possible conflict between the Railway Labor Act and the
Civil Aeronautics Act, the Board must first decide whether labor policies are
relevant to the administration of the subsidy program," and, if relevant, how
best to accommodate the two acts.' 2
These problems were present in the recent case of American Overseas Air-
lines, Inc. v. CAB,' 3 in which a carrier sought to recoup through its subsidy
all losses suffered as the result of a pilots' strike.' 4 At the preliminary hearing
9. See Leiserson, The Role of Government in Industrial Relations, in UNIONS, MAN-
AGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 865, 866 (Bakke & Kerr ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as BAKKE
& KERR] (federal labor legislation of the 1930's designed to "equalize [union] ... bargain-
ing strength with . . . management. . ."). The Railway Labor Act increases union bar-
gaining power by protecting the organizational and collective bargaining rights of unions.
48 Stat. 1,187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1952) ("Employees shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing"). See
GAGLIARDO, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 473 (1953) ("if workers combine
into unions, their bargaining power will be increased"). See also NATIONAL MEDIATION
BOARD, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 1 (1940), quoted
in KAHN 133 (the act provides "a model labor relations policy based on equal rights and
mutual responsibilities") ; Smith, Recent Developments in Labor Law, in BAKK & KERR
849, 856 (one objective of Railway Labor Act was "development of strong, independent
unions"). In fact, the Railway Labor Act was extended to airlines as a congressional
response to the demands of the Airline Pilots Union. See KAHN 132-34; Frankel, supra
note 8, at 466 (the act a "product of our union-fostering labor past . . ."). Amendments
permitting the check-off and union security agreements have further increased union
strength. 64 Stat. 1238-39 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1952).
10. See note 57 infra and accompanying text. Conversely, disallowances may alter
the course of labor relations by reducing the airline's "ability to pay" union wage de-
mands. See KAHN 177; PETERSON, SURVEY OF LABOR ECONOMICS 294 (1947) (ability to
pay sets outside limit of wage offer). Specific disallowances may also affect labor relations
by forcing layoffs or the employment of less expensive personnel. See Mid-Continent Air-
lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 464, 471-72 (1942) (stewardess salaries disallowed); Chicago & So.
Air Lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 161, 181 (1941) (cafeteria expenses, including salaries, dis-
allowed).
11. The only explicit consideration of Railway Labor Act policies by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act is found in § 401(1) (4), 52 Stat. 990 (1938) (now Federal Aviation Act
§ 401(k) (4), 72 Stat. 757 (1958)), which makes airline compliance with the RLA a pre-
requisite for CAB certification as a carrier.
12. The Board ignored prior opportunity to attempt such an accommodation. See
Kahn, The National Air Lines Strike: A Case Study, 19 J. AIR L. & Com. 11, 21-22
(1952). The case here noted represents the CAB's first step toward construing the two
acts in pari materia.
13. 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
14. The strike lasted seventeen days during October 1947. The airline was then on a
temporary, prospectively set rate. Estimating the amount of losses "attributable" to the
strike proved difficult. See Opinion of the Board, Joint App., pp. 117-20, American Over-
seas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, supra note 13 [hereinafter cited as Joint App.]. The airline
claimed that the maximum amount that could be disallowed for reimbursement purposes
was the loss of profits during the strike period plus the difference between the subsidy
required to break even without any return on capital in the strike year and a similar figure
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before a CAB trial examiner, Overseas argued that the strike was precipitated
by the bad faith of the union,' 5 that nonreimbursement would retard carrier de-
velopment,' and that disallowance of strike costs would induce airline ac-
ceptance of all future union wage demands, thereby necessitating increased
sublidies.17 The union intervened and contended that management's first argu-
ment was untenable since the question of strike responsibility is not "practically
justiciable.""' In addition, the union opposed federal subsidization of airline
strike losses as giving management an unfair advantage in collective bargain-
ing.' 9 Representing the CAB, Bureau Counsel also said that strike costs should
not be reimbursed. He claimed that they are nonrecurring and therefore had
already been sufficiently compensated for when the Board computed that com-
ponent of the subsidy representing a return on investment.20 The trial examiner
rejected the Counsel's argument by treating strike losses as part of that com-
ponent of subsidy payments which reimburses airline operating expenses-
the component instantly at issue.21 The examiner then attempted to reconcile
union and management interests with a compromise solution designed to ensure
good faith bargaining by management without undermining its resistance to
unreasonable union demands. 22 Having deemed strike responsibility an inade-
in a nonstrike year. This sum (less cost savings during the strike) was approximated at
$363,000. The Board, however, computed strike losses on a subsidy-per-mile basis, estimat-
ing that the airline would have flown 7,785,000 revenue-miles in 1.947 if there had been
no strike, and would have required a total of $5,053,000 for mail pay and subsidy, or
$0.6491 per mile. As a result of the strike, the airline flew only 7,343,000 revenue-miles
and required $5,364,000 for mail pay and subsidy, or $0.6811 per mile. The $0.0320 per
mile difference was considered the result of the strike, and the Board reduced the airline's
mail service and subsidy reimbursement rate by this amount-a total disallowance of
$585,000 of subsidy. Joint App., p. 119. The Board's disallowance included, in effect,
operating costs for the period of the strike as well as loss of revenue. This method of
"costing" the strike seems preferable to the airline's, since it results in strike losses which
most closely resemble the losses which would be suffered by the unsubsidized carrier. See
notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
15. Brief for American Overseas Airlines, Inc. to Examiner A. Vernon Radcliffe,
pp. 30-36.
16. See id. at 30, 42.
17. Id. at 40-41.
18. Joint App., p. 114. Although the union made no appearance, it filed a written
statement of its position. Id. at 35 & n.33. The union did not formally contest the issue of
strike responsibility, but union officials testifying at the hearings denied that union actions
had caused the strike. See Testimony of John C. Christie, Air Line Pilots Association
Negotiator, id. at 776-82.
19. Id. at 35-36.
20. Id. at 31-34. This approach was consistent with the position tentatively adopted
by the Board after the strike had occurred. "The unpredictability of a contingency such as
this establishes it as one of the risks of doing business to be reflected as part of the cost
of capital rather than as a normal cost of operations." Statement of Tentative Findings
and Conclusions, CAB Order No. E-2731 (April 19, 1949), quoted in Kahn, Regulatory
Agencies and Industrial Relations: The Airlines Case, 42 Am. EcoN. Rav. 686, 695 (Supp.
1952).
21. Joint App., pp. 38-40.
22. Id. at 40.
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quate criterion for determining the carrier's right to reimbursement, because
fault allocation is "always controversial and usually impossible of accurate
proof,"'2 3 and having responded to the union's claims by disallowing any return
on investment or reimbursement of depreciation and amortization for the
period of the strike-ten per cent of the total loss-, the examiner sought to
satisfy the carrier's need for funds by awarding a subsidy for the remaining
ninety per cent of loss sustained during the strike.24
The CAB approved both the trial examiner's basic premise that labor policy
is an important consideration in computing subsidies and his rejection of strike
responsibility as a subsidy determinant,2 5 but held that labor policy is best
effectuated by automatically denying reimbursement for all strike losses.20 The
Board said that any subsidization of strike costs would violate a governmental
policy of neutrality in labor disputes by depriving the union "of its most sig-
nificant economic weapon. '27 As an alternative justification for complete dis-
allowance, the CAB stated that the subsidized rate of return on investment for
non strike periods adequately compensated the risk of strike losses, and that
further reimbursement would therefore be gratuitous.2 8
23. Id. at 37-38. The examiner added that "procedures, personalities, and substance
may become inextricably interwoven and incapable of separate evaluation."
24. Id. at 40-42.
25. Id. at 114.
26. Ibid. ("It is ... a basic tenet of fair government policy that there be no partisan
intervention in a labor controversy . .
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 117. This contention is inconsistent with the Board's statement that strike
losses should not be compensated in any manner. See notes 26, 27 sapra and accompany-
ing text.
As another justification for disallowing Overseas' claims, the Board maintained that
public utility regulatory bodies do not usually recognize strike losses. Id. at 115. While
this statement is generally correct, the analogy between the CAB and other regulatory
bodies is imperfect, since no other agency directly reimburses expenditures through a sub-
sidy designed to develop the industry. For decisions of other regulatory bodies which re-
fused to recognize strike losses, see Baltimore Transit Co., 94 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129, 132 (Md.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952) (strike losses cannot be recouped through increase in rates) ,
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 487, 495 (1919) (strike expenses
must be deducted from net profits); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 433, 470-71 (1915) (plan to amortize strike losses as an operating expense re-
jected); cf. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 73 P.U.R. (n.s.) 12, 20 (D.C. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1947) (strike period disregarded in determining cost basis for future rates);
Buck v. International Ry., 1925D P.U.R. 782, 801-02 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n) (same).
But cf. Construction and Repair of Ry. Equipment, New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 107 I.C.C.
721, 728, 733-34 (1926) (expense incurred in sending locomotives to other shops for repair
during period of strike held "reasonable").
The difficulty attending comparisons-of the CAB with other regulatory agencies has
been noted. See Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 108
(1948) ("[W]e see no reason why the efforts of the Congress to foster and regulate
development of a revolutionary commerce that operates in three dimensions should be
judicially circumscribed with analogies taken over from two-dimensional transit") ; Mid-
Continent Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 45, 54-55 (1939) (denying analogy between the Board's
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On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit, reversing and remanding, held
that the Board's consideration of federal labor policy was not authorized by
the Aeronautics Act.2 9 According to the appellate decision, two Supreme Court
cases, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,3 0 and Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Sum-
merfield,31 limit the CAB to the specific terms of section 406 when setting
mail rates.3 2 These rates, the court concluded, must reflect only the amount of
funds needed by a particular carrier to perform its predetermined role in the
national air transportation system.33 The court emphasized that the Board had
erred in using general grounds of labor policy as a substitute for actual proof
that the disallowed amounts were not essential to Overseas' developmental
"need."3 4 Turning to the Board's alternative ground, the court admitted that
strike costs could be disallowed if previously compensated for by the return-
on-investment subsidy, but found no evidence indicating that this procedure
had been followed. 30
The court's rejection of this latter argument, while proper, could have been
based on grounds more substantial than an insufficiency of evidence. In the
light of the conventional subsidy procedures employed in Overseas,36 Board
inclusion of the risk of nonrecurring costs such as strike losses in computing
the rate of investment return would have violated the statutory standard of
"need." To fulfill its function of enabling the carrier to compete for capital
funds,37 the rate of return must reflect the risks borne by the airline investor.3 8
rate-making authority and that of other regulatory agencies) ; Transcontinental & W. Air,
Inc. v. CAB, 336 U.S. 601, 609 (1949) (dissenting opinion) (same). But see id. at 604
(Civil Aeronautics Act "need" standard has counterpart in other types of rate setting) ;
Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 462, 469, 135 F. Supp. 946, 949 (1955)
(comparing CAB and ICC regulation).
29. 254 F.2d at 748.
30. 347 U.S. 67 (1954).
31. 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
32. 254 F.2d at 748 (act "does not permit mail pay to depend upon Government policies
in labor disputes").
33. Id. at 749.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 750 ("These are matters upon which the Board must make determinations
... supported by findings of the facts."). This holding is in accord with the usual judicial
requirement that findings of administrative agencies must be supported by substantial evi-
dence appearing in the record. Cf. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951) (collecting cases). A judicial decision
turning on the failure of the record to contain specific findings also has the effect of
obviating judicial appraisal of an unwieldy record whenever counsel are unable to produce
evidence of the necessary findings.
36. See Joint App., p. 111. For an explanation -of these procedures, see notes 3-6
supra and accompanying text.
37. "The important consideration is that the rate . . . shall place [the carrier] . . .
in a position whereby it is enabled to enter the private capital market and obtain needed
funds for its legitimate purposes at reasonable rates." Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 4
C.A.B. 419, 421 (1943).
38. See CHAMBERLAIN & EDWARDS, THE PRINCIPLES OF BOND INVESTMENT 13 (rev.
ed. 1927) ("The risk finds its most patent expression in the ratio of current return ex-
1958]
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When subsidies are set prospectively, the likelihood of nonrecurring, unfore-
seeable costs makes accurate prediction of airline expenses unfeasible, thus
creating the possibility that the expense-reimbursement component of subsidies
will be inadequate. 39 To offset this additional investor risk, the Board allows
an increased rate of investment return in granting temporary future subsidies. 40
When, however, final subsidies are set retrospectively, as in the principal case,4 1
"unforeseeable" expenses have already been incurred, and the rate of return
should be lower, since no risk of inaccurate cost estimations remains. 42 By in-
sisting that strike costs were specifically provided for in the airline's retrospec-
tive investment return, the Board disregarded the distinction between future
and retrospective rate-setting. In fact, increasing the retrospective rate of in-
vestment return to cover the risk of "unforeseeable" costs grants the airline
a rate which is higher than necessary to enter the capital market and which
thus exceeds developmental "need." 43 Even if the Overseas Board meant that
strike losses should not be reimbursed because the rate of investment return
incorporates the risk of unsubsidized losses, the court properly reversed the
Board on this ground. When a loss is disallowed in computing a subsidy, the
reason is not that the investment rate reflects the risk of disallowance but that
the loss was not incurred in furtherance of national air policy.44
pected of the capital") ; HARDY, RISK AND RISK-BEARING 5 (1923) (amount of profits
demanded depends on risk assumed) ; IEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EmPLOYMENT
INTEREST AND MONEY 144-45 (1936). But see GRAHAM & DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS
101-02 (2d ed. 1940) (denying that a mathematical relationship exists between yield and
risk since security prices depend primarily on stock "popularity" based largely on non-
economic considerations). For a review of pre-Keynesian economic "risk" theories, see
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 22-48 (1921).
39. See note 2 supra (discussing necessity of adopting temporary rates).
40. The future rate is generally about 3% higher than the retrospective rate. See Joint
App., p. 39 n.34; cf. Braniff Airways, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 607, 616 (1948) (unpredictability of
certain costs necessitates their inclusion in the cost of capital). See also Hellman, Coln-
nient on Air Mlail Subsidy, 25 IND. L.J. 43, 45-46 (1949).
41. The Board was "finalizing" Overseas' rate for the period from Jan. 1, 1946 to
Sept. 25, 1950. Joint App., p. 31.
42. The only risk borne by the investor when rates are set retrospectively is the pos-
sibility that certain incurred costs will be disallowed as part of the expense reimbursement
component, and will therefore have to be compensated for by funds originally allocated
to investment return. The Board did not contend that it had foreseen its own action by
increasing the investment-return component of the subsidy to cover the specific risk of
strike cost disallowance. Nor, in all likelihood, did the fear of strike loss enter into in-
vestor expectations, since relatively few strikes had occurred in the airlines industry, and
Board policy toward strike losses was unclear. See Joint App., p. 117 n.11 (few strikes
in the airlines industry) ; note 12 supra (uncertainty of Board policy).
43. The Board usually attempts to minimize subsidy payments so long as the develop-
ment of the airline is not retarded. Cf. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 45, 50
(1939) (subsidy expenditures should yield "the greatest possible results") ; Gellman, The
Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial
Survey and Analysis, 24 J. Am L. & Com. 410, 417 (1957) (Board attempts to maximize
benefits derived from subsidies).
44. See notes 5, 6 supra and accomDanying text (statutory bases of disallowance).
See also note 42 supra.
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While correctly finding that strike losses were not compensated for by the
rate of investment return, the court of appeals failed to demonstrate the in-
sufficiency of the Board's other ground for decision-that federal labor policy
can justify the exclusion of strike losses from the expense-reimbursement
component of an airline subsidy. The Western and Delta precedents relied
upon by the court in overruling the Board's decision do not prevent the CAB
from weighing labor policy in determining whether losses should be subsidized.
In those cases, the utilization of industry-wide policies as a basis for setting
mail rates was rejected because the CAB did not show the individual needs of
the carriers involved.4 Although the Board in Overseas likewise failed to state
45. In Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954), the Board, in computing
the carrier's subsidy, ignored profits which Western had derived from a route sale. The
Board thus sought to provide an incentive for other carriers to make similar transfers.
The Supreme Court reversed the Board on the ground that the application of industry-
wide policies violates the statutory standard if the CAB fails to consider the "need" of the
individual carrier at issue. The Court implied, however, that the Board may implement
an industry-wide policy on showing that policy affects the individual carrier concerned.
No finding was made that there was "need" for the additional subsidy, in the sense
that otherwise Western would not have been willing or able to make the transfer
... in accordance with the development program which the Board deems advisable.
Whether such a finding would have satisfied the statutory requirement is a ques-
tion we do not reach ....
Id. at 73. This language appears to represent an invitation which the Board declined in
Overseas. See 54 COLUm. L. REv. 626, 628 (1954) ("[Western and Delta] may have little
significance if ... [the Board may bring] all considerations relevant to furthering the
policy of the Act under the canopy of the individual carrier's 'need.'").
Under one interpretation, the Delta decision may have shut the door that Western left
ajar. In Delta, the Board had refused to offset earnings of the carrier's domestic division
against losses incurred by its overseas operation in order to protect the competitive posi-
tion of the domestic division with respect to other, solely domestic, carriers. The court
held that "economic policy" did not justify Board exclusion of any revenue, since § 406(b)'s
mandate to "consider . .. all revenue," see text of statute quoted at note 2 supra, foreclosed
Board discretion. In ignoring the Board's contention that Delta itself would be injured
by the offset, the Court seemingly disregarded the intimation in Western that policies
affecting the individual carrier may be effectuated.
A more logical and consistent interpretation is that Delta was a case in which the
Board failed to make its finding sufficiently explicit. Ci. note 35 supra. On the basis of its
past decisions, the Supreme Court would hardly force the Board to administer the subsidy
program in a manner which would impede the development of the subsidy receiver. See
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, supra; Transcontinental & IV. Air, Inc. v. CAB, 336 U.S.
601 (1949). Furthermore, a narrow reading of Delta would result in a restriction of
administrative discretion not required by the statute, for the act's direction to "consider"
all revenue is readily interpreted to permit a certain measure of Board discretion. See
Summerfield v. CAB, 207 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion) ("The
elastic statutory phrase ... is sufficiently flexible to permit the omission of domestic earn-
ings . . ."). Cf. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950).
In Roig, the Supreme Court, interpreting a statute requiring the Secretary to take into
consideration certain factors, id. at 608, said that "Congress did not think it was feasible
to bind the Secretary as to the part his 'consideration' of these ... factors should play in
his final judgment. . . ." Id. at 612. Compare Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 298
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specifically that its decision was aimed at the "need" of the individual carrier,
that failure was irrelevant, for any subsidy determinations which weaken the
collective bargaining process will inevitably affect the carrier in question. Poor
union-management relations usually precipitate strikes and other forms of in-
dustrial strife which obstruct a carrier's performance. 46 In fact, recognition of
this danger caused Congress to promote its aviation policy by extending the
Railway Labor Act to airlines in order to encourage peaceful collective bar-
gaining.47 Since strike-loss reimbursement might reduce the effectiveness of
this legislatively desired bargaining procedure and thus impede national air
transportation,48 the Board is required by statute to consider federal labor
goals in determining carrier "need" under section 406.49 Instead of rejecting
the Board decision for resting on nonstatutory grounds, the court of appeals
U.S. 349, 358-59 (1936) (statute requiring "consideration" of railroad's financial need
calls for an evaluation of various factors which vary from case to case).
A congressional attempt to overturn the Western and Delta decisions died in commit-
tee. See Hearings on S. 3426 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The bill's demise did not necessarily represent
approval of the Court's decisions, but may have reflected congressional reluctance to adopt
legislation which would increase a subsidy burden already much-criticized. See note 2
sulpra.
46. See GAGLIARDO, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 430 (1953) (to prevent
strife each side must "whole-heartedly" accept collective bargaining) ; Myers, Basic Em-
ployment Relations, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLIcT 319 (Kornhauser, Dubin & Ross ed. 1954)
(employer-employee relationship focal point of conflict).
47. "[The purposes of the Railway Labor Act as amended] are (1) To avoid any in-
terruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; . . . (4) to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements cover-
ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 48 Stat. 1186-87 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a)
(1952). These aims are implemented by machinery facilitating collective bargaining. See
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 559 (1957) ("On numerous occasions, this Court has
recognized that the Railway Labor Act protects and promotes collective bargaining");
Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 (1937) ("[The act's] provisions
are aimed at the settlement of industrial disputes by the promotion of collective bargain-
ing . . ."). See also note 9 supra. The Railway Labor Act was extended to cover airlines
in 1936. See note 8 supra.
48. See notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text.
49. Previous Board utilization of labor policy in determining the necessities of carrier
development has been judicially approved. When reviewing prospective mergers, the Board
often insists that carriers adopt schemes which will protect workers' seniority rights. Such
consideration of labor policy has been held within the Board's authority. See Kent v. CAB,
204 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1953) ("[The] public interest . . . is to obtain the degree of
stability in air transportation that freedom from industrial strife will provide") ; Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952) (labor protective provisions justified
as preventing interruptions to commerce). See also KAHN 404-05 (enumerating various
ways in which Board actions influence labor relations). This commentator-one of the
few writing on airline industrial relations-has consistently emphasized the importance
of Board consideration of labor policy. See id. at 405 ("The CAB . . .cannot affcrd to
be ignorant about the effect on the industrial relations picture of its ... economic de-
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should have examined that decision to determine whether it reasonably imple-
mented the subsidy program's objective of airline development.50
To evaluate the Board's solution properly, the court would have had to con-
sider the carrier's financial need, the union's right to free and equal collective
bargaining, the public interest in minimizing subsidy payments, and adminis-
trative feasibility. The first part of the Board's opinion, which rejected strike
responsibility as a subsidy determinant,5 ' seems consonant with these con-
siderations, particularly ease of administration. Since strikes often follow a long
period of strained labor relations, fault allocation necessitates a detailed his-
torical analysis and is therefore impractical. 52 Furthermore, even if the CAB
cisions") ; Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and Industrial Relations: The Airlines Case, 42
Am. EcoN. Ray. 686, 695-98 (Supp. 1952).
Aside from the "need" standard, Board authority to consider labor policy can also be
justified by the fact that, since the Railway Labor Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act are
both designed to promote air transportation development, they should be construed in pari
materia. Cf. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) ("Frequently the entire
scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme
to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it undertake
this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task.") ; Wilson v.
United States, 250 F.2d 312, 320 (9th Cir. 1958) ("statutes dealing with the same general
subject matter are to be construed in pari iateria') ; Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Rail-
road Retirement Bd., 239 F.2d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("interrelated [acts] must be read
together") ; Anderson Tully Co. v. Murphree, 153 F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 1946) ("effect
must be given to each [statute] in order to effectuate the legislative intent") ; A. P. W.
Paper Co. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 193 (1946) ("[These]
principles of statutory construction [in pari inateria], are too elementary to require citation
of any authorities"). But cf. S. S. W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 664-65
(1951) (discussing possible conflict between results of air transportation regulation and
public interest as expressed in other acts).
50. Any doubts on the adequacy of the decision's implementation of Civil Aeronautics
Act objectives should have been resolved in the CAB's favor, for the Board is uniquely
qualified to evaluate the interaction of various congressional policies related to airline
development. See American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 84
(1956) (CAB is an "administrative agency of special competence that deals only with
the problems of the industry") ; cf. Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546
(1942) ("Congress has . . . delegated the enforcement of transportation policy to a per-
manent expert body and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic
character of transportation problems"). In order to utilize CAB expertise, courts should
allow the Board to exercise its discretion to the full extent which the statute permits. Cf.
Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 593 (1949) ; Cities Serv. Gas Co.
v. FPC, 155 F.2d 694, 698-99 (10th Cir. 1946).
51. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
52. To allocate fault, the Board would have not only to look at the negotiations im-
mediately prior to the strike but also to investigate the general background of the carrier's
labor relations. See Opinion of the Board, Joint App., p. 115 n.49; Opinion of the Ex-
aminer, id. at 37-38; REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 187 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as REYNOLDS). Labor strife may be an emotional response to events which
happened years before. See, e.g., Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945). And even the
negotiations prior to the strike may stretch over a long period. See Kahn, The National
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attempted such an analysis, the only criteria for fixing strike responsibility-
violations of the Railway Labor Act-are inadequate, because the practices
proscribed by the act are ill-defined and mainly limited to organizational prob-
lemsY3 Of course, the Board could implement the act's provisions with its own
regulations. But the CAB has described itself as inadequately prepared to use
its present authority to enforce carrier compliance with labor legislation; hence,
any expansion of labor-policing functions would contradict the Board's evalua-
tion of its own expertise.5 4 Moreover, although administrative supervision of
Air Lines Strike: A Case Study, 19 J. AIR L. & Com. 11, 12-14 (1952) (five months before
machinists' strike) ; id. at 15-17 (one year before pilots' strike).
Furthermore, the Board's refusal to allocate fault was consistent with the general posi-
tion taken by other regulatory agencies. See cases cited in note 28 supra. Many agencies
have a general aversion to interference in labor matters. Cf. Oakland v. Key System Tran-
sit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150, 156 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953) ("In ... areas of human
conduct, government has established a policy of non-regulation") ; Mutual Tel. Co., 1921B
P.U.R. 209, 212 (Hawaii Pub. Util. Comm'n 1920). But cf. State v. Broad River Power
Co., 157 S.C. 1, 63, 153 SE. 537, 558 (1929) (when attempting to abandon service because
of a strike, the company must show it exhibited "a reasonable and proper attitude to the
employees . . ."); Capital Transit Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 449, 459 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1955) (concurring opinion) (labor relations termed the "exclusive prerogative of manage-
ment"; nevertheless, events surrounding the strike scrutinized to ascertain whether it was
"provoked") ; Terre Haute City Lines, No. 1496-A (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 2, 1954),
abstracted in 5 P.U.R. Digest 176 (Supp. 1958) (certificate revoked since company exerted
no "reasonable" efforts to settle a strike).
53. The proscribed practices are failure to exert reasonable efforts to settle disputes,
interference with the designation of bargaining representatives, interference with union
organization, and coercing employees to sign yellow-dog contracts. 48 Stat. 1187-88 (1934),
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). See Northrup, Unfair Labor Practice Prevention Under the
Railway Labor Act, 3 IND. & LAB. RE. Ray. 323, 328 (1950) (main function of act is
elimination of company unions). See also MacIntyre, The Railway Labor Act-A Misfit
for the Airlines, 19 J. AIR L. & Com. 274, 283 (1952) ("There is no concept of an 'unfair
labor practice' under the Railway Labor Act").
Furthermore, the act has not been extended to proscribe any union practices and con-
tains only a few sanctions which could provide a basis for determining union fault. Cf.
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 131-34, 235 P.2d 792, 793-94 (1951)
(describing union refusal to deal with multi-employer bargaining representative; un-
punished, although a technical violation of the act) ; KAHN 385 ("the Railway Labor Act
contains no penalties to check improper union activities") ; Frankel, Airline Labor Policy,
the Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR L. & Com. 461, 476-77 (1951). Bnt see
Northrup, supra at 339 (certain union practices can be enjoined).
The most pertinent violation for fault-finding purposes would be refusal by either side
to make "reasonable" efforts to settle disputes. But determination of this violation is diffi-
cult, since the failure of the two parties to reach an agreement does not by itself indicate
lack of a reasonable effort on either side. Cf. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395, 402 (1952) (NLRA provision requiring good faith bargaining "does not compel any
agreement whatsoever between employees and employers").
54. Although airlines are statutorily required to comply with the Railway Labor Act
before they can be certified by the CAB, see note 1.1 supra, in twenty years of administer-
ing the Civil Aeronautics Act the Board has never utilized this provision to penalize a
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labor relations may be desirable, manipulation of subsidy payments is a sin-
gularly circuitous way to achieve this objective. 5
That part of the Board's decision rejecting the examiner's partial reimburse-
ment of strike costs rl is also consistent with the reconciliation of union, car-
rier, and public interests. Arguably, if management were compensated for
strike losses, the resulting decrease in union bargaining power 57 might diminish
labor strife because management dominance in collective bargaining would
discourage labor opposition. 5 But equality rather than inequality in bargaining
strength is generally recognized as the most effective means of securing indus-
carrier for improper labor activities. During the National Airlines strike of 1948, a recom-
mendation of decertification was threatened by Bureau Counsel, but settlement of the
strike foreclosed the issue. See Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and Industrial Relations: The
Airlines Case, 42 AmI. EcoN. REV. 686, 695-96 (Supp. 1952). At that time, the Board in-
dicated that it felt qualified to judge the merits of a labor controversy and enforce the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Ibid. Subsequently, however, the Board become more
modest in its contentions and, in Overseas, stated that an inquiry into labor relations "is
... beyond the scope of our expertise." Joint App., p. 115 n.4a.
55. The absence of administrative enforcement provisions similar to those in the Taft-
Hartley Act has been decried as the greatest weakness of the Railway Labor Act. The
latter is enforceable only in court. See Maclntyre, supra note 53, at 285. For a comparison
of the two acts, see Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act
-A Comparison, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1937). Enforcement of the RLA is made even more
difficult by the complex procedure for invoking the act's criminal sanctions to halt employer
practices. See Northrup, supra note 53, at 331 (only one case has ever been brought to trial
under the penalty provisions of the Railway Labor Act). But this problem can more easily
be solved by congressional amendment of the Railway Labor Act than by Board utilization
of the subsidy program as a means of punishing the carrier or union for improper labor
activities. Cf. Smith, Government Policy Concerning Airline Subsidy, 25 J. AIR L. & Com.
79 (1958) ("[subsidy should not be] used as a substitute for timely and effective regula-
tory action by the government"). But cf. KAHN 176, 406 (supporting more CAB involve-
ment in labor matters).
56. For the decision, see notes 26, 27 supra and accompanying text.
57. Since union bargaining power is based largely on the ability to force employers to
choose between alternative costs-strikes or higher wages-the elimination of strike costs
would substantially diminish that power. See Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and Industrial
Relations: The Airlines Case, 42 A-r. EcoN. Rxv. 686, 695 (Supp. 1952) ("union bargain-
ing power might be crippled if strikes could impose no economic losses on the carriers").
See also CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 223-24 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
CHAMBERLAIN] ; GAGLIARDO, op. cit. supra note 46, at 512.
Of course, strike loss reimbursement would not completely eliminate union power, since
strikes may have long-run detrimental effects which injure employers. See Baltimore
Transit Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 453, 457 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956) (permanent loss of
revenue due to customers who did not return after the strike) ; CARPENTER, CASE STUDIES
IN¢ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 99 (1953) (union defeats may lower employee morale and pro-
ductivity). But these effects are only incidental to the direct employer strike losses which
constitute the real basis of union power. On strike costs generally, see DANKERT, CON-
TEMPORARY UNIONIsm 407-10 (1948).
58. See HARRISS, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 248 (1953) ("Another variety of indus-
trial peace reigns because employees have no real opportunity to combine effectively to
uppose their employer; the union is too weak ... ").
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trial peace.5 9 Indeed, federal subsidization of airline strike losses would prob-
ably increase the number and severity of strikes by removing management's
strongest incentive to settle disputes-financial injury flowing from a strike.60
The examiner's solution of subsidizing only a portion of the strike losses might
minimize but would not eliminate the possibility of increased strife.61 Thus, the
uninterrupted operation necessary for airline growth can best be achieved by
refusing to reimburse any strike losses. This result would be consistent with
the Board's practice of disallowing the reimbursement of expenditures which
may be in the financial interest of a carrier but which do not add to the de-
velopment of national air transportation. 6 2 Furthermore, since the Board by
declining to assess strike responsibility assumes good-faith bargaining, 3 com-
plete rejection of strike-loss reimbursement is also required by the Railway
Labor Act's policy of governmental neutrality in fairly conducted labor dis-
59. See United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1939) (on the Railway Labor
Act) ; National Labor Relations Act § 1, 61 Stat. 136-37 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
Union "equality" and industrial peace are primarily fostered through collective bargaining.
See note 9 supra and accompanying text; Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S.
515, 553 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43, 45 (1936)
Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930).
60. Without the pressure of possible strike losses, management would have little in-
centive to reach agreement with a union. See CHAMBERLAIN 215, 221-23 (size of manage-
ment's offer depends on estimation of strike costs) ; cf. REYNOLDS 184 (without the fear of
strike "there is no reason why an employer should make any concession whatever to a
union"). See also note 82 infra. Although elimination of the pressure of strikes upon em-
ployers would reduce union chances of winning disputes, unions probably would still strike.
The most violent strikes in labor history occurred during a period of government-sup-
ported management resistance. See DANKERT, Op. Cit. supra note 57, at 34-35. When a
strike occurs, the same reluctance to compromise might prolong the stoppage. See id. at
406 (suggesting that if the desire to compromise is absent, strikes can only be settled by
outside intervention). See generally Slichter, The Determinants of Bargaining Power,
in BAKKE & KERR 205-06.
6k The examiner implied that the fear of stockholder disapproval resulting from his,
and any future, disallowance of funds intended for dividends would replace the "normal"
incentive to settle disputes. Joint App., p. 40. But the relatively small size of his disallow-
ance renders this effect questionable. Cf. Chamberlain, Management in Theory and Prac-
tice, in BAKKE & KERR 255, 264 (discussing management loyalty to stockholders). Further-
more, the examiner's solution would prevent governmental neutrality. See note 64 infra
and accompanying text.
62. See cases cited note 6 supra. The Board is not required to underwrite operations
of the carrier if subsidization would conflict with the developmental aims of the act. "The
purpose of the Act is not primarily to advance the private interests of carriers, but the
public interest in an adequate air transport system. . . . [P]rivate interests . . . should
yield to the broader interests of the public." United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100,
107 (7th Cir. 1952). See also Capital Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 171 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir.
1948).
63. If the Board did not assume that management had bargained in good faith, it
would be violating its statutory duty to punish carriers not complying with the Railway
Labor Act. See note 11 supra. See also note 54 supra.
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putes.0 4 Any cost subsidization would represent intervention on the side of
management. 05
Refusing to reimburse any strike losses, although the best solution, would
require the CAB to pass on the reasonableness of airline wage costs. If an
airline were denied strike loss reimbursement, it would tend to avoid labor
trouble by accepting all wage demands on the theory that every increase in
labor costs would be subsidized as part of regular operating expenses. 66 Unions
might thus achieve wage increases unnecessarily larger than those obtainable
through ordinary collective bargaining.6" If these increases were reimbursed,
federal subsidies would be forced above the minimum amount required to pro-
64. "Neutrality," in the sense used here, means that unless the public welfare demands
it or one party acts unreasonably, the government will leave the resolution of labor dis-
putes to the collective bargaining process. See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943) (The Railway Labor Act "seeks to provide a means
by which agreement must be reached .... [C]onditions may be as bad as the employees
will tolerate or be made as good as they can bargain for.") ; Railway Labor Act § 10, 44
Stat. 586-87 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1952) (presidential emergency board convenes to
make recommendations in disputes only when interruption in "essential transportation" is
threatened). Of course, to the extent that it supports collective bargaining, the act may be
considered as favoring labor. See note 9 supra. But collective bargaining is aimed at pre-
venting strife and thereby aids management as well. See note 59 supra and accompanying
text. For another expression of "neutral" federal labor policy, see the National Labor
Relations Act § 1, 61 Stat. 136-37 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
Government neutrality in labor disputes is also reflected in state unemployment com-
pensation statutes which bar payments to striking workers. See Unemployment Compen-
sation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 145 n.2 (1946) (forty-three states have such
provisions). In order to provide an incentive for compliance with the Railway Labor Act,
however, a federal statute allows railroad workers to receive unemployment benefits while
on a legal strike. 52 Stat. 1098 (1938), 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2) (iii) (1952) ; Brotherhood
of Ry. Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 239 F.2d 37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1.956). This pro-
vision has not been extended to airline employees.
65. See note 57 supra.
66. "Had we given in to the union in this instance, we would have increased our
operating costs materially. I presume that the Bureau Counsel would not have complained
about that, and that whatever the costs were would have been accepted . . . ." Joint App.,
p. 716 (statement by the general manager of American Overseas Airlines, Inc.). See also
the decision of the examiner, id. at 40 (discussing resistance of carrier to union demands).
67. In collective bargaining, union and management each set an acceptable range of
figures within which it hopes to fix the wage rate. When the two ranges do not overlap
prolonged disagreement results, and the ultimate wage rate will depend in large part upon
the relative bargaining strength of each side. CHAMBERLAIN 213-15. But if wage increases
do not present a threat of pecuniary loss, the employer will have an unusually high upper
limit to his range. Wage rates will thus be higher than those that unsubsidized carriers
pay. Cf. 'Moulton, The Resistance To Increasing Money Wages, in BANcKE & KERR 679
(in the normal market employers seek to reduce wages). See also DEARING & OWEN,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICy 214 (1949) (presence of subsidy eliminates the usual
balancing of costs and revenue). Other theories of wage determination-besides the bar-
gaining power approach-would also be inapplicable, since they are premised on employer
opposition to union demands. See GAGLIARDO, op. cit. supra note 46, at 466-73 (stating the
theories). Wages would be limited only by the fear of adverse public opinion. See note 85
infra.
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mote air transportation-an amount reflecting the wage costs of a comparable
unsubsidized carrier forced to seek the lowest possible wages. s The Overseas
Board recognized this possibility, but insisted that the prospect of financial in-
dependence would provide carriers with sufficient incentive to prevent wages
from exceeding the rate paid by unsubsidized carriers. 69 This incentive may
be inadequate, however, for local-service and overseas carriers-the two prin-
cipal classes of subsidized airlines.70 Financial independence is a remote pros-
pect for the local carriers,71 and the fortunes of an overseas airline depend as
much on the subsidies given to competing, government-owned, foreign carriers
as on its own cost reductions.72 Moreover, since strikes could impair the ability
of a subsidized carrier to pay dividends, its immediate desire to satisfy in-
vestors and attract new capital might outweigh the prospective advantage of
financial independence.7 3
68. Without explicitly defining developmental "need" in terms of the requirements of
unsubsidized airlines, the Board has always sought to encourage subsidized carriers to act
like free-market firms. See O'Connell, Air Mail Pay Under the Civil Aeronautics Act,
25 IND. L.J. 27, 29 (1949) ("basic concern over mail pay is whether or not it leads airline
management . . . to make their decisions as businessmen normally do"). Compare Hell-
man, supra note 40, at 44-45 (basic concern should not be whether carriers act like ordi-
nary businessmen but whether they add to the development of air transportation).
Other regulatory agencies have compared the operation of the utilities they regulate
with the practices of competitive firms. See, e.g., Rates and Rate Structures, 1 P.U.R.
(n.s.) 113, 140 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1933) ("If [the company] ... were in a com-
petitive business and followed such ideas [it] . . . would soon be eliminated . . .").
Requiring airlines to pay free-market wages would not force them to pay the theoretical
wages which would be set in a purely competitive market. Rather, subsidized lines would
be limited to the wages paid by existing firms which employ cost techniques generally
recognized as the most efficient in the existing market for labor. See Slichter, Wage
Policies of Employers, in BAKKE & KERR 681 (discussing "market" wage).
69. Opinion of the Board, Joint App., pp. 114-15.
70. 1957 CAB ANN. REP. 10. Officially, the overseas carriers "were temporarily taken
off the subsidy list in 1957, pending the establishment of final rates." Ibid. But the inter-
national carriers have traditionally constituted a major class of subsidy beneficiaries, and
one authority indicates that they are still receiving subsidy payments. See Smith, Govern-
ment Policy Concerning Airline Subsidy, 25 J. AIR L. & Com. 79, 80 (1958).
71. See Adams, Future of the Local Service Carriers[:] Public Service vs. Federal
Subsidy, 23 J. AIR L. & CoM. 127-38 (1956); Gellman, The Regulation of Competition
in United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 24 J.
AIR L. & Com. 410, 423 & n.32 (1957). Subsidization of local carriers has been criticized
as not consistent with the purposes of the act. See DEARING & OWEN, op. Cit. supra note
67, at 218-23 (1949).
72. See Smith, Government Policy Concerning Airline Subsidy, 25 J. Am L & CoM.
79, 80 (1958). Foreign governments are willing to subsidize their carriers for the prestige
gained from having a national airline. See Hearings on Air Mail Subsidies Before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 246-47 (1952).
See also Hearings on S. 3426 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1954).
73. "[I]f the Board should decide to disallow them [strike losses] in full ... no man-
agement would ever feel it could afford to risk its investors' money and take a strike ......
Joint App., p. 765 (testimony of Ralph S. Damon, president of Trans-World Airlines).
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Consequently, Board utilization of a "reasonable wage" test is indicated. By
comparing the labor costs of the airline under consideration with similar costs
of unsubsidized carriers-giving weight to any significant differences in work-
ing conditions-the Board could determine whether the subsidized airline is
avoiding the normal bargaining process and relying on reimbursement of in-
creased labor costs. 74 Any unreasonable excess revealed by this comparison
should then be disallowed for reimbursement, since unnecessary for carrier
development.7 ; As a result, taxpayers would not bear the burden of unpro-
ductive subsidy payments. Furthermore, adoption of the proposed test would
accord with the practice of other public regulatory agencies, which often ad-
judge the reasonableness of wages,76 and with that of the CAB, which has
Taking a strike in this situation is not analogous to a corporation's skipping dividends in
order to finance long-range programs. The airline would be sacrificing an assured sub-
sidy income in anticipation of problematical financial independence; the corporation would
be using earnings to gain more income in a project which is more certain to succeed.
74. This test assumes that wage agreements reached by unsubsidized airlines are simi-
lar to those which would be reached by a subsidized carrier if it conducted wage negotia-
tions with the normal managerial incentives. See notes 67, 68 supra. Only a rough com-
parison could be expected, since wage agreements are sometimes dependent upon bargaining
factors unique to the individual firm or union. See CHAMBEM.AiN 222.
75. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
In order to make the disallowance effective, the Board should not allow excessive wage
costs to be passed on through higher passenger or freight rates. The existence of relative-
ly close substitutes makes airline demand elastic. See Kahn, Wage Determination for
Airline Pilots, 6 IND. & LAB. REtL REv. 317, 318 (1953). Therefore, increased rates would
lead to a decrease in demand for service. Cf. Clemens, Collective Bargaining in the Regu-
lated Industries[ :] The Interdependence of Wage and Price Determination, 42 Am. EcoN.
REv. 674, 681 (Supp. 1952) (impact of higher labor costs in transit industry has been
decline in demand for service). And under the standard of "need," the Board would be
forced to compensate the resulting loss in revenue by increased subsidies.
76. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 P.U.R. (n.s.) 243, 260 (N.H. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1947) (commission can review wages when they are "out of balance" with pre-
vailing wage rates) ; Oakland v. Key System Transit Lines, 1 P.U.R.3d 150, 157-58 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953) (refusing automatically to raise fares to cover wage increases) ;
Western N.Y. & Pa. Traction Co., 1920A P.U.R. 951, 954 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1919) ("the Commission should see to it that [wages are] . . . reasonably incurred before
permitting [them] ... to be loaded upon the public . . .") ; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
1933B P.U.R. 181, 187-88 (S.C.R.R. Comm'n) (reviewing and reducing allowable wage
expenses) ; cf. K. L. M. Tel. Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 112, 117-18 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956)
("[I]t is within our power and duty to determine whether or not the proposed salaries
are reasonable for the service performed . . ."). But see Madison Ave. Coach Co., 79
P.U.R. (n.s.) 125, 127 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1949) ("We have no jurisdiction over
the rates of pay .... [W]e must take into consideration whatever wage claims actually
and currently exist."); Chicago & N.W.R.R., 26 Wis. R.R. Comm'n Rep. 705 (1921)
(accepting current wage rates) ; cf. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Spillman, 6 F.2d 663,
665 (D. Neb. 1925) (employee compensation within managerial discretion).
One commentator suggests placing the entire wage problem of public utilities in the
hands of utility commissions. Updegraff, Public Utility Labor Problems, 33 IowA L. REv.
609, 614 (1948).
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occasionally assumed a similar responsibility. 77 The Board has already gained
the expertise to apply the proposed standard through its use of comparisons
in determining the reasonableness of other airline costs. 78 Administration
would be further facilitated by the industry-wide character of large airline
unions and their efforts to establish wage formulas applicable, with minor
variations, to all carriers. 79
If adopted, the reasonable wage test would place the subsidized airline in
the same bargaining position as an unsubsidized carrier. Faced with a wage
demand which could not be offset by more efficient operations,"° an airline
77. The CAB's position on its power to disallow unreasonable wages is unclear. Com-
pare Bonanza Air Lines, Inc., 16 C.A.B. 322, 325 (1952) (wage increase found unreason-
able), and Braniff Airways, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 607, 628 (1948) (various cost increases, in-
cluding wages, compared with carriers and found reasonable), with All Am. Aviation, Inc.,
8 C.A.B. 805, 813 (1947) (approving wage increase without any evident consideration of
its reasonableness), and Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 161, 179 (1941) (execu-
tives' salaries question of managerial discretion ordinarily not calling for Board review).
See also KAHN 407 (management anticipates necessity of justifying wage increases to the
Board).
In setting future rates, the Board avoids the wage issue by refusing to provide for
any prospective wage increases. See Robinson Airlines Corp., 16 C.A.B. 58, 62 (1952)
("[A]nticipated payroll increases . . . are not recognizable for mail-rate purposes, and,
if incurred, should be offset by continuing efforts to achieve maximum economy and
efficiency in operations.") ; Trans-Texas Airways, 12 C.A.B. 101, 114 (1950) ; Southwest
Airways Co., 11 C.A.B. 651, 655 (1950); West Coast Airlines, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 662, 665
(1950); Western Air Lines, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 285, 292 (1949). The Board will make allow-
ance, however, for increases already agreed upon but not to take effect until some future
date. Ibid.
78. See, e.g., Colonial Airlines, Inc., 1951-1954 Av. L. REP. 1 21409.06 (CAB 1951)
("the use of cost comparisons to determine the level of reasonable expense is a necessary
and proper administrative tool . . .") ; Braniff Airways, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 607, 628 (1948)
(comparing various cost categories with the "experienced level of other domestic car-
riers . . "). See also O'Connell, szpra note 68, at 33 & n.18. Comparisons have become
increasingly more important in recent years. See 55 COLUM. L. REv. 933, 934-35 (1955).
79. Pressure by Congress, the NLRB and the Postmaster General forced all certified
carriers to adopt a single wage formula for pilots. Civil Aeronautics Act § 401(1) (1), 52
Stat. 90 (1938) (now Federal Aviation Act § 401 (k) (1), 72 Stat. 756-57 (1958)), Laugh-
lin v. Riddle Aviation Co., 205 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Northrup, Collective Bargaining
by Airline Pilots, 61 Q.J. EcoN. 533, 535 (1947).
Although present-day bargaining is on an individual-carrier basis, wage agreements
reached with the larger airlines have served as precedents for the remainder of the indus-
try. See KAHN 361-63. Nevertheless, the pilots' union has consistently rejected proposals
for multi-employer bargaining. See Western Air Lines, Inc, v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130,
131-34, 235 P.2d 792, 793-94 (1951) (describing union refusal to deal with industry-wide
committee) ; KAHN 364-68. Other large airline unions have indicated that they would not
oppose industry-wide bargaining. Id. at 371.
80. On the ability of more efficient firms to pay higher wages, see Pool, The Capacity
of Industry To Pay Wages, in BAKKE & KERR 694, 696. Wage increases which cannot be
passed on to consumers may force employers to adopt more efficient methods in order to
avoid losses. See Clemens, supra note 75, at 681 (transit industry absorbed wage increases
partly through more intensive utilization of capital) ; Pool, The "Econony of High
Wages," in BAKKE & KERR 752-53; Reynolds 398-400; cf. Capital Transit Co., 9 P.U.R.3d
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would have to determine whether the demand was sufficiently in line with
other carriers' wage rates to merit CAB subsidization.81 If the wage increase
exceeded a reasonable and hence subsidizable amount, the airline would have
to balance the costs of a possible strike against the excessive portion of the in-
crease and choose the alternative minimizing its loss.82 With management thus
forced to view union demands in the perspective of profit maximization, wages
would be fixed at or near a free-market level. True, the carrier would be in-
jured-as is every employer-if compelled to bear the costs of a strike or of
unreasonable wages. But this burden is consistent with the statutory objective
of "economical ... management. '8
3
Moreover, the techniques employed in airline labor negotiations would
minimize any financial injury caused by CAB refusal to subsidize excessive
wages or strike losses. The present widespread acceptance of grievance arbi-
tration and the Railway Labor Act's compulsory arbitration provisions would
largely eliminate strikes for nonmonetary objectives.8 4 Strikes over wages
449, 456-57 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1955) (concurring opinion). The CAB has in-
dicated that carriers absorb wage increases through greater efficiency. Robinson Airlines
Corp., 16 C.A.B. 58, 62 (1952).
81. See notes 74, 75 supra and accompanying text.
Industry-wide bargaining patterns would simplify carrier determination of the "reason-
able wage" which would be reimbursed by the Board. See note 79 supra.
82. Employers have "concession schedules" comparing wage changes with strike costs.
Up to a certain point, an employer would grant wage increases rather than take a strike;
beyond that point, he would accept the strike in preference to higher wages. See CHAM-
BERLAIN 218; Smith, Implications for Collective Bargaining in Quasi-Public Work, 74
MONTHLY LAB. Rzv. 257, 259-60 (1952).
Fear of commission disapproval provides other regulated industries with an incentive
to resist wage demands. See Clemens, supra note 75, at 674. Management fear of CAB
disapproval would be desirable, for management is actually representing the government
and the taxpayer, who ultimately subsidize allowed wage increases. Cf. SLIcHTEa, THE
CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 30 (1947) (in normal bargaining, management
represents consumer interests).
83. See text of statute quoted note 2 supra; notes 5, 68 supra and accompanying text;
ef. Note, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 410, 420 (1949) (concerning public utilities) :
[T]he public would be more benefited by permitting a few interruptions in service
with low rates than by demanding continuous service at rates disproportionately
high, the assumption being that with free collective bargaining, the right to strike,
and certain limits on the rate of return, the contestants will arrive at a figure within
the existing rate structure after the necessary test of strength.
84. No record of an airline strike over nonmonetary issues other than grievances has
been found. And more than 80% of all United States air carriers have arbitration clauses
in their union contracts designed to prevent grievance strikes. See KAHx 397.
The protracted 1948 National Airlines grievance strike occurred despite an arbitration
clause because the arbitrators were evenly split over a proper solution. See Kahn, The
National Air Lines Strike: A Case Study, 19 J. Am L. & Com. 11, 15 (1952). The sub-
sequent addition of an impartial arbitrator should prevent similar breakdowns in the
arbitration process. See KAHN 398; Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery[:]
A Critical Analysis-Il, 5 IN. & LAB. REL. Rzv. 540, 559 (1952).
Compulsory grievance arbitration could be provided through the National Air Trans-
port Adjustment Board, authorized by § 205 of the Railway Labor Act, which if convened
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would also be infrequent because the delay and publicity accompanying Rail-
way Labor Act mediation and fact-finding procedures tend to keep union re-
quests at reasonable levels 85 and, under the proposed test, subsidized airlines
could accept reasonable wage demands without fear of being denied reimburse-
ment.86 Even if strikes occur, they would probably not be dangerously pro-
longed, for the self-interest of airline employees-particularly the pilots and
would have the same authority as the previously established Railroad Adjustment Board.
49 Stat. 1190 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1952). Cf. Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 907, 909 & n.5 (W.D. Wash. 1953) ; UAW v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 63
(N.D. Ga. 1949). For a description of compulsory arbitration provided by the Railroad
Adjustment Board, see, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1957) ; Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). To date, the
NATAB has not been convened. See 23 NATIONAL MEDIATION BD. ANN. REP. 41 (1957)
(voluntary acceptance of arbitration has obviated establishing NATAB).
Grievances can be defined as "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective
bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation, generally involving only one em-
ployee. They may be contrasted with 'major disputes' which result when there is dis-
agreement in the bargaining process for a new contract." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., supra at 33. See also Frankel, Airline Labor Policy, the Step-
child of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR L. & CoM. 461, 468 (1951). Actually, grievances
are often difficult to distinguish from other union interests. See MacIntyre, supra note 53,
at 284 & n.45 (collecting cases exemplifying this difficulty).
Some authorities have urged that compulsory arbitration be applied to wage determina-
tions as well as grievances in publicly regulated industries. See Updegraff, Compulsory
Settlement of Public Utility Disputes, 36 IowA L. REv. 61 (1950). But see Note, 97 U.
PA. L. REv. 410, 417-18 (1949) (opposing compulsory arbitration). A congressional at-
tempt to extend compulsory arbitration to cover wages within the framework of the Rail-
way Labor Act died in committee. For the proposal and its implications, see Hearings on
S. 3463 Before the Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act Amendments of the Senate Coln-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
85. "[I]n the case of railroads it seems likely that the delays and publicity attending
the bargaining procedure exert a restraining influence upon the timing, and possibly the
magnitude of wage changes . . . ." Harbeson, Collective Bargaining in the Regulated In-
dustries-Discussion-, 42 Am. EcoN. REv. 699 (Supp. 1952). See also REYNOLDS 312 (re-
sistance of employers and unions diminishes through the Railway Labor Act's "process of
attrition"). Cf. Smith, Implications for Collective Bargaining in Quasi-Public Work, 74
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 257, 262 (1952) (public reaction a factor in collective bargaining).
Concern with public reaction to wage demands is also reflected in publicity campaigns dur-
ing disputes. See Bell, Industrial Conflict and Public Opinion, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
240, 252-53 (Kornhauser, Dubin & Ross ed. 1954) ("The Propaganda War") ; CHAMBER-
LAIN 230. But see Northrup, The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes in
Wartime, 36 AM. EcoN. REv. 324, 341 (1946) (emergency boards ineffective because
unions disregard public opinion).
Excessive union demands may also be deterred by fear that their actions will lead to
adoption of undesirable legislation. See Clemens, supra note 75, at 676-77.
Although tending to reduce demands, the mediation and fact-finding provisions of the
act have not been directly successful in preventing work stoppages. See KAHN 384, 385;
cf. Northrup, supra at 342.
86. See notes 74, 75 supra and accompanying text. The proposed solution would also
eliminate the possibility that strikes would occur because of worker dissatisfaction which
results from comparing wages with those paid by similar carriers. Cf. CHAMBERLAIN 246.
Airlines would not resist such wages since the)y would be subsidizable.
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other skilled technicians who have few alternate employment opportunities-
would ordinarily prevent unions from forcing a carrier into bankruptcy.8 7
By reducing the likelihood of large subsidy disallowances, these bargaining
techniques would also serve to maintain the attractiveness of airline invest-
ments. Of course, the suggested approach might increase the risk that airlines
will incur nonreimbursable strike or wage costs which have to be absorbed
from the investment-return component of the subsidy."8 While some increase
in the investment component may therefore be necessary to overcome investor
resistance resulting from this additional risk, the expectation that few strikes
will occur should minimize the amount of the increase.8 9 Indeed, refusing to
subsidize strike and excessive wage costs might eventually make airlines a
more attractive investment than they would be otherwise. By taking the sub-
sidy program out of collective bargaining, the Board would prepare airlines
for the possibility that they will become financially independent of taxpayer
support, with their expenditures subject only to the forces of the market.90
87. Whether a union will force an employer out of business through a strike depends
on the ability of its members to transfer to other jobs. See REYNOLDS 403. The high de-
gree of specialization decreases the mobility of airline employees. On this specialization,
see Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and Industrial Relations: The Airlines Case, 42 Am.
EcoN. REv. 686, 687 (Supp. 1952). Airline employees are therefore hesitant to forfeit their
jobs for the sake of winning a dispute. Cf. GAGLIARDO, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 253-54 (1953) ("the union understands that the terms of the agreement must be
such that the industry or plant can continue to operate at a relatively high level of employ-
ment"). But cf. CARPENTER, supra note 57, at 420 (1953) (unions implement an "abstract
principle" that employers who cannot meet minimum wage demands should not be per-
mitted to remain in business) ; CHAMBERLAIN 242-43 (ill-informed members may force
union officers to make unreasonable demands) ; Note, 67 YALE L.J. 98, 101 n.16 (1957)
(collecting authorities noting the union's demand for more wages at any cost). The fear of
unemployment also serves to reduce the union's original wage demands since the likelihood
that wage increases will lead to a reduction in the employment force is particularly acute
in the airline industry. The volume of decline in employment due to a particular wage
increase generally depends on the elasticity of demand for labor. REYNOLDS 406. The high
ratio of labor cost to total cost in the airlines industry makes the long-run demand for
labor extremely elastic. Kahn, Wage Determination for Airline Pilots, 6 IND. & LAB. REi.
REv. 317, 319 (1953) (airline labor costs equal one half of total cost). For an additional
factor causing elasticity, see KA H-N 109 (long-run demand for labor elastic, since this
demand is derived from demand for air transportation which is elastic).
88. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
In Overseas, the record suggests that no increase in the investment-return component
of the subsidy was necessary after the Board's "tentative" finding that strike losses would
be disallowed. See note 20 supra.
90. "[I]t is important not only that the industry be rapidly expanded but also that it
be brought to a stage of development where it can be weaned from the subsidy and made
to stand on its own feet." O'Connell, supra note 68, at 27.
Although subsidized airlines would seem to be a good investment, since the subsidy
almost guarantees a steady rate of return, investors have more confidence in the unsub-
sidized carriers. See Smith, supra note 70, at 81 (air transportation would be a better
credit risk if "governed by the usual rules of good business") ; cf. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
3 C.A.B. 733, 763 (1942) (an unsubsidized carrier is "regarded as of greater financial
stability than one whose prosperity depends upon a subsidy").
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